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Abstract—Nowadays many people store photos in smartphones.
Many of the photos contain sensitive, private information, such as
a photocopy of driver’s license and credit card. An arising privacy
concern is with the unauthorized accesses to such private photos
by installed apps. Coarse-grained access control systems such
as the Android permission system offer all-or-nothing access to
photos stored on smartphones, and users are unaware of the exact
behavior of installed apps. Our analysis finds that 82% of the
top 200 free apps in a popular Android app store have complete
access to stored photos and network on a user’s smartphone,
which indicates possible private photo leakage. In addition, our
user survey reveals that 87.5% of the 112 respondents are not
aware that certain apps can access their photos without informing
users, and all the respondents believe that the stored photos on
their smartphones contain different types of private information.
Hence, we propose PhotoSafer, a content-based, context-aware
private photo protection system for Android phones. PhotoSafer
can detect private photos based on photo content with a well-
trained deep convolutional neural network, and control access to
photos based on system status (e.g., screen locked or not) and
app-running status (e.g., app in the background). Evaluations
demonstrate that PhotoSafer can accurately identify private
photos in real time. The efficacy and efficiency of the implemented
prototype system show the potential for practical use.
Index Terms—Smartphone, Photo, Privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
Smartphones have shifted the way people take, store and
share photos. There is an increasing number of people who
are able to take photos with smartphones anytime, anywhere.
Also, almost all social networks allow users to share photos
from corresponding smartphone apps (e.g., Instagram). Conse-
quently, more and more people prefer to store photos on their
smartphones for convenience, even though some photos are
private and sensitive (e.g., driver’s license). It is reported that
the average person has 630 photos stored on their phones [1].
However, many installed apps on smartphones have access to
stored photos and the network, which may cause leakage of
private photos to remote parties. This raises a privacy concern
that users’ private photos might be accessed by apps without
their awareness.
The Android platform offers users two approaches for
controlling access permissions. At the early stage of Android,
users are asked to grant permissions when they install an app.
Specifically, an app will disclose the full list of resources that it
wants to access at installation. Either all requested permissions
are granted, or the entire installation is aborted. Prior research
has shown that most users do not care about or understand
these disclosures at installation [2]. With the evolution of the
Android platform, a new permission scheme has replaced the
install-time disclosures for enhancing smoothness of instal-
lation process. In particular, users need to grant permissions
only when an app requests a sensitive resource for the first use.
Their decisions to these permission requests will be applied
to all future requests by that app for the same permission.
However, this scheme only considers a user’s preference for
permission requests when an app is used for the first time.
An app once granted access to a photo at the first access
will be able to access all photos all the time. It does not
account for the fact that the user’s preference for subsequent
permission requests might change under different contextual
circumstances. For instance, a user is willing to upload a photo
that was taken in a private gathering through a social-network
app; however, the same user might feel uncomfortable for the
same app running in the background to access such private
photos without his awareness.
To protect private photos, some apps have been developed
[3], [4], [5], which apply authentication techniques (e.g.,
password and fingerprint) to control access to those photos.
However, they either significantly affect the usability and user
experience or cannot really secure private photos. Specifically,
users are usually required to manually identify and import
private photos from the native photo gallery app on Android
to such third-party apps. It is very challenging and boring for
users to manually select private photos from hundreds or even
thousands photos on their mobile phones. Moreover, some of
these apps only copy private photos to a specific protected
folder but still keep them in the native photo gallery app, which
requires users to remove those private photos from the native
photo gallery app. If a user forgets to do so, no protection
can be provided. Even worse, some apps merely move user-
specified private photos to a hidden folder, which can be easily
detected and accessed without any challenge by using existing
file management apps [6], [7], [8]. In addition, when a user
wants to share private photos with other people through social
network apps such as Instagram, since these social network
apps usually only allow users to choose to-be-shared photos
from the native gallery app or the file management system, it
is inconvenient for users if private photos are kept in separate
app-specified folders. Hence, existing solutions cannot really
secure private photos while offering friendly user experience.
Some work has been done for refining Android permission
systems. Nauman et al. [9] and Jeon et al. [10] designed
fine-grained permissions for Android, but do not specifically
protect stored private photos. CHIPS [11] is a face-recognition-
based access control system for stored photos on Android
phones, but can only protect photos that contain pre-specified
faces, which cannot be applied to other types of private photos
(e.g., credit card).
To this end, we design a novel content-based, context-
aware private photo protection system named PhotoSafer for
Android phones, which provides real-time access control over
private photos based on photo contents and the contextual
status of accesses, and discloses the specific sensitive content
that private photos contain to users before the photos can be
accessed. Our contributions are as follows:
• We analyze the top 200 free apps on Apkpure, which is a
very popular third-party Android app store, for evaluating
the potential privacy risks that current apps pose to private
photos.
• We conduct an online survey with 112 respondents to
investigate smartphone users’ privacy concerns over pri-
vate photos, including common types of private photos,
awareness of photo-accessing operations by apps, etc.
• We design a novel content-based, context-aware private
photo protection system PhotoSafer, which can automati-
cally identify private photos and perform real-time access
control over private photos based on the contextual status
of mobile phone and whether the requesting apps are
running in the foreground.
• We implement a prototype system on the Nexus 5 phone,
and evaluate the system’s performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents how this work is motivated, including a permission
analysis of 200 popular apps and an online survey. Section
III introduces the design and workflow of PhotoSafer. Section
IV describes the prototype implementation. Section V shows
evaluation results. Section VI discusses the limitations of
this work. Section VII reviews related work. Section VIII
concludes the paper and discusses future work.
II. MOTIVATION
To better understand the privacy issues with photos stored
on mobile phones, we firstly analyze the requested permissions
of 200 apps to demonstrate the potential risk of unauthorized
access to private photos, and then investigate users’ concerns
about private photos in the real world through an online survey.
A. Permission Analysis
Let us first analyze what permissions are required to ac-
cess stored photos on the Android platform. For an Android
device, photos are stored in the external storage directory
that can be either a physical removable memory card or a
logical partition in the device’s memory. Hence, to access
stored photos, an app has to be granted the permission
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE, which is the only required
permission. However, the external storage directory is not the
repository only for photos, but also for other files such as
songs. As a result, the correlation between the permission
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE and photo access control is not
intuitive to average users. In addition, due to the aforemen-
tioned limitations of the Android permission system, users are
allowed to choose whether an app can access to all stored
photos, but cannot do selective control over any individual
photo.
Next, we analyze apps’ requested permissions to examine
the potential risk of unauthorized access to stored photos.
Due to the download restrictions of Google Play, we an-
alyze the top 200 free apps (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, etc.)
from Apkpure [12], which is a popular third-party Android
app store. We particularly identify apps that request both
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE and INTERNET permissions,
since the combination of these two permissions allow potential
leakage of private photos to another party. The analysis tool
Androguard [13] is used to extract the requested permissions
of each analyzed app. It is found that 164 out of the 200 apps
request both READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE and INTERNET
permissions. That means 82% of the top 200 free apps on
Apkpure have complete access to stored photos on a user’s
phone, and could even leak these photos through the Internet.
Thus, there is a necessity for finer-grained access control on
private photos.
B. Online Survey
PhotoSafer’s design is also motivated by an online survey
which is designed to investigate smartphone users’ concerns
about unauthorized access to private photos. The survey was
conducted with user consent under an IRB approval from the
University of Arkansas. The survey is available online [14],
and the results here show statistics of all the 112 responses
collected by December 22, 2017. The mobile phone platform
usage of respondents is described in Table I, and the age
distribution of survey respondents is shown in Table II.
TABLE I: Mobile Phone Platform Usage of Survey Respon-
dents
Mobile Phone Platform Proportion of Respondents
Android 77.7%
iPhone 21.4%
Windows Phone 0.9%
TABLE II: Age Group Distribution of Survey Respondents
Age Group Proportion of Respondents
Less than 20 years 5.4%
20-30 years 84.8%
30-40 years 9.8%
Participants were asked whether they store private photos
(driver’s license, passport, etc.) on their mobile phones. An
overwhelming majority (88.6%) deemed that some private
photos are stored on their mobile phones. To explore which
specific type of photos are considered as private by respon-
dents, this survey provides different options for participants.
As shown in Table III, almost every participant considered
photos that contain Photo ID, Legal Documents and Family as
private, and over a half (57.9%) agreed that nude photos are
also sensitive. In a consequence, the above four types of photo
contents are used as references to identify different categories
of private photos for this work. Even though those types do
not cover all cases, they can represent a significant portion of
private photos in the real world.
TABLE III: Photo Types and the Proportion of Respondents
That Consider Them as Private
Photo Type Proportion of Respondents
Photo ID (e.g., driver’s license, passport) 97.4%
Legal Documents (e.g. SSN) 97.4%
Family (e.g., family party) 76.5%
Nudes 57.9%
Furthermore, as shown in Table IV, 67.5% of the partic-
ipants agreed that there are more than 10 installed apps on
their mobile phones that are granted access to photos. Also,
for each of the participants, there is at least one installed app
that has access to the photos stored on her/his mobile phone.
However, the results show that most of participants (87.5%) do
not clearly know whether any installed app can access photos
in the background or not without their awareness. As a result,
it is an urgent necessity to design a system to protect private
photos from being accessed without users’ awareness.
TABLE IV: Number of Installed Apps That Can Access Photos
Number of Installed Apps Proportion of Respondents
10+ 67.5%
6-10 21.9%
1-5 10.4%
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
This section describes the design of PhotoSafer.
A. System Overview
Our goal for designing PhotoSafer is to protect private
photos from unauthorized access by mobile apps, without
changing the way apps access photos and how users store
photos on their mobile phones. In addition, the system should
not affect the usability of apps and user experience; i.e., the
access control enforcement decision must be made within a
reasonable amount of time.
Our basic idea is that when an app requests to access
a particular photo, users should be aware of it and decide
whether the app can access that photo. The naive approach
is to prompt users to check the photo and make a decision
every time. However, this will definitely degrade the usability
of the system and apps. To address this problem, PhotoSafer is
designed to be able to automatically check whether the content
of photo is private, and determine whether the user is aware of
the app’s access request based on the contextual status of the
phone and the app. Specifically, when the phone is locked, the
user is not operating the phone for photo access and thus most
likely does not know that an app is accessing the photo. Even
when the phone is unlocked, the app which requests access to
the photo might be running in the background. In this case,
the user probably also does not know that the app is accessing
the photo. Generally, a user is aware of the photo access if
the app is running in the foreground, since usually the access
request is triggered by the user in this scenario. In this case,
the system can automatically check the photo content through
a trained classifier and inform the user whether the photo
contains private information and what private information it
is. The system also allows the user to determine whether the
access request should be permitted. To minimize the time
needed to identify private photo content during user operation,
PhotoSafer caches the identified contents of photos in a
database in advance. In this way, PhotoSafer can achieve real-
time response to photo access, such that the requesting app’s
usability and user experience will not be affected. To make
the system work, PhotoSafer needs to be integrated into the
Android kernel as a system service, since it needs privileges
to interpose photo access. When PhotoSafer is initialized, it
will feed all stored photos into a trained classifier to identify
photo contents (e.g., photo ID), and then the result will be
stored in a database. Whenever a new photo is added, it will
be fed into the classifier and the classification result will be
updated into the database.
The workflow of PhotoSafer is shown in Figure 1. When
an app requests to access a specific photo, the photo access
will be interposed and system status will be checked. If the
phone is locked, then the access request will be automatically
denied. However, if the phone is unlocked, the system will
continue checking the app’s status. If the app that requests
photo access is running in the background, then the access
request will also be automatically denied. On the contrary, if
the app is running in the foreground, the photo content can
be immediately obtained by querying the database, where the
content type of each photo is stored. Finally, if the photo is
classified as public (i.e., the photo does not contain private
content), the access permission will be automatically granted.
Otherwise, an alert will be prompted by informing the user
of what private information is contained in the photo and
requesting the user to determine permission. If the user trusts
the app and grants permission to it, then the photo access will
be continued; otherwise it will be denied.
B. Architecture
As Figure 2 shows, the system consists of four major
modules: photo access interposition, status checker, photo
content classifier, and photo content database. We can divide
the overall workflow of PhotoSafer into three steps. First,
when the system is initialized on a phone, the pre-trained
photo content classifier performs classifications on all stored
photos, and the results will be stored in the photo content
database. In the database, each record consists of a tuple
(photo id, content type), where photo id is the unique
identifier in each photo’s universal resource identifier (e.g.,
content://com.android.providers.media.documents/document/image%photo id)
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Fig. 1: The workflow of PhotoSafer
in Android and content type represents whether a specific
photo is not private or contains which specific type of private
content, such as (‘10001’, ‘public’) and (‘10002’, ‘photo
ID’). Then, when an app requests to access a specific photo,
the photo access interposition module will interrupt the app’s
operation and trigger the status checker module to check the
system status and the app’s current running status. If the
phone is either locked or the app is running in background,
the access request will be directly denied. Otherwise, a query
with the photo’s photo id will be sent to the photo content
database. Finally, if the returned result from photo content
database shows the photo is public, the access request will be
automatically permitted, and photo access interposition will
resume the app’s operation. However, if the photo contains
some private information, an alert will be prompted by
describing what private information is contained in the photo
and requesting the user to make the decision of whether the
photo access interposition should resume the app’s operation
or not.
The design of PhotoSafer is based on several technolo-
gies available in off-the-shelf mobile phones. Photo access
interposition can be done by modifying the Android kernel.
The status checker can be implemented by Android APIs
KeyguardManager and ActivityManager. The photo
content database can be implemented by using SQLite. Next,
we will describe how to identify private photos.
Status 
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Photo Access 
Interposition
Photo 
Content
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Photo Content  
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Photo Access
 Decision
Fig. 2: The architecture of PhotoSafer
C. Photo Content Classifier
Given an input photo in pre-defined dimensions, this module
aims to detect whether that photo contains some specific pri-
vate information. This is done by training a deep convolutional
neural network (DCNN) to detect the private content of photos.
Formally, let P be the set of input photos. For a given photo
x ∈ P, let y ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} encode the categorical labels
{‘public’, ‘photo id’, ‘legal document’, ‘family’, ‘nude’} of
the photo. Let H be the hypothesis space of possible deci-
sion functions, and f(θTx) be the decision function, where
θ = {θ1, θ2, . . . , θN} is the network weights. Hence, the loss
function can be defined as L(f(θTx), y). Let E(L) be the
expected loss over the range of inputs P. In this work, we use
cross-entropy to estimate the loss, and hence the optimization
task is to minimize the expected cross-entropy loss.
f = argmin
f∈H
E(L) (1)
For each input x, the corresponding classification result is
f(x), and hence the according accuracy acc(x) can be defined
as:
acc(x, y) =
{
+1 y = f(x)
0 otherwise
(2)
However, the main challenge for training a DCNN to iden-
tify private photos is acquiring a sufficient number of private
photos to train on. Generally, a DCNN requires a relatively
large set of training data to perform well. To address this
challenge, we adopt the transfer learning [15] approach to train
our DCNN model. Specifically, we pretrain a DCNN model
on a large dataset ImageNet [16], which contains 1.2 million
images with 1000 categories. Then, we tune the parameters of
the output layer in the pretrained model on a smaller number
of private photos that we have collected.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
Due to the time limitation, we implemented PhotoSafer as
a standalone app on Android phones instead of integrating it
into the Android kernel. We plan to implement its integration
with Android kernel in future work. Generally, the app works
like the native photo gallery app that comes with the Android
system. The prototype app was specifically designed so that
it will access some private photos under different system
status and app-running status. The photo content classifier was
implemented using Python 2.7 and Tensorflow [17], which is
an open-source deep learning framework. The other modules
were implemented by available technologies, as mentioned in
Section III-B.
A. Photo Content Classifier
This module aims to identify whether a given photo is public
or contains some specific private information. As described in
Section III-C, we use transfer learning to train a DCNN model.
In particular, we build the classifier using the Python APIs of
Tensorflow and adopting MobileNets [18]. The MobileNets are
a class of DCNNs that are specifically designed for efficiently
running on mobile devices. The significant difference between
the MobileNets architecture and a traditional DCNN’s is that
instead of a single 3x3 convolution layer followed by batch
norm and rectified linear unit (ReLU), MobileNets split the
convolution into a 3×3 depthwise convolution layer and a
1×1 pointwise convolution layer. It has been demonstrated that
the computing operations and model size will be significantly
reduced in this way. MobileNets are usually not as accurate
as traditional DCNNs, but it provides a trade-off between
accuracy and resource usage. Specifically, MobileNets offer
two parameters to tune the resource and accuracy trade-off:
width multiplier and resolution multiplier. The value of width
multiplier should be set between 0 and 1, while the resolution
multiplier might be various. The width multiplier allows us to
adjust the thickness of the DCNN, and the resolution multiplier
changes the input dimensions of images, which can reduce
the internal representation complexity at every layer. Table
V shows that, given a fixed resolution multiplier, when the
width multiplier increases the number of computing operations
and parameters also dramatically increases. However, when the
width multiplier is fixed, the larger the input dimension, the
more the required computing operations.
In this work, we fix the input dimension as 224 × 224,
but change the width multiplier for comparisons in Section
V-B. Firstly, we train the MobileNets on ImageNet with fine-
tuning parameters. After that, we fine-tune the output layer of
pretrained model with our collected dataset of private photos,
but keep the parameters of other layers unchanged. The details
of the dataset are described in Section V-A.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we systematically evaluate the performance
of PhotoSafer through a number of experiments. To better
illustrate the benefits provided by our proposed system, we
also make comparisons against existing approaches. Partic-
ularly, we conduct the following experiments. Firstly, we
conduct extensive experiments to measure the private photo
identification accuracy. Secondly, we test the time taken by
the system to obtain photo content classification results from
the database. The evaluations for classification accuracy are
done on Ubuntu 17.04 64-bit machine with 32G RAM and
one NVIDIA TITAN Xp GPU. The other experiments are
conducted on Nexus 5 phones.
A. Dataset
Since private photos that are shared on a public domain
are limited, it is a challenging task to collect private photos
for training deep learning models. Furthermore, there is no
standard definition of ‘private photo’ applicable for every user,
since it is a very subjective determination. Thus it is hard to
collect one private photo dataset to cover all cases. However,
Zerr et al. [19] published a dataset collected from Flickr,
which is the only known publicly available dataset for photo
privacy research at this time. This dataset consists of 37,535
photos, which are labeled as Private, Public and Undecided.
Since the private photos in this dataset do not include most of
the private types reported from our survey, we only use the
Public photos from this dataset as public photos in our dataset.
Additionally, we collect 3,097 private photos in four common
types as shown in Table III from Google Image, with some
example photos shown in Figure 3. 80% of the dataset is used
for training, and the remained 20% is used for testing. The
distribution of each type of photo is illustrated in Table VII.
B. Classification Accuracy
As described above, we trained MobileNets models with a
fixed input dimension of 224 × 224 but with different width
multipliers. To be specific, we set the width multiplier as 1.0,
0.75 , 0.5 and 0.25 separately. To compare the classification
accuracy, we compare our MobileNets model with two base-
line models. One is the Inception v3 model [20] that is trained
on the same dataset. The other one is that we extract the bag
of visual words (BOVW) [21] from photos and then train it
with support vector machine (SVM). All the models except
SVM+BOVW are trained in two ways. Firstly, we directly
train each model with our dataset. Secondly, we adopt transfer
learning to train each model; i.e., we firstly train each model
with ImageNet and then fine-tune the model with our dataset.
As shown in Table VIII, the classification accuracy of each
model that is trained in transfer learning is higher than that
of each directly trained model. In particular, we observe that
the accuracy improves between 17% and 23% (in absolute
value). It also shows the Inception v3 model has a slightly
higher accuracy than the MobileNet 1.0 224 model, but the
model size is much bigger than the MobileNet 1.0 224 model.
This means it requires much more computation resources for
only a little performance improvement, which is not a good
fit for resource-constrained mobile phones. In addition, with
respect to those MobileNets models, with the decreasing width
multiplier the classification accuracy becomes lower and the
model size is smaller. Based on the above comparisons, we
choose the MobileNet 1.0 224 model with transfer learning
as our final classifier due to its high classification accuracy
and reasonable model size.
TABLE V: MobileNets with Different Width Multipliers
Width Multiplier ImageNet Accuracy Million Operations of Mult-Add Million Parameters
MobileNet 1.0 224 70.6% 569 4.2
MobileNet 0.75 224 68.4% 325 2.6
MobileNet 0.5 224 63.7% 149 1.3
MobileNet 0.25 224 50.6% 41 0.5
TABLE VI: MobileNets with Different Resolution Multipliers
Resolution Multiplier ImageNet Accuracy Million Operations of Mult-Add Million Parameters
MobileNet 1.0 224 70.6% 569 4.2
MobileNet 1.0 192 69.1% 418 4.2
MobileNet 1.0 160 67.2% 290 4.2
MobileNet 1.0 224 64.4% 186 4.2
TABLE VII: Dataset Distribution
Photo Type Number of Photos
Photo ID (e.g., driver’s license, passport) 1353
Legal Documents (e.g. SSN) 469
Family (e.g., family party) 682
Nudes 543
Public 14664
TABLE VIII: Comparison of Classification Accuracy and
Model Size
Model Accuracy Model Size
SVM+BOVW 73.2% 400 MB
Inception v3 80.3% 87.4 MB
MobileNet 1.0 224 77.5% 17.1 MB
MobileNet 0.75 224 72.6% 10.5 MB
MobileNet 0.5 224 68.7% 5.5 MB
MobileNet 0.25 224 63.3% 2 MB
Inception v3+Transfer Learning 97.3% 87.5 MB
MobileNet 1.0 224+Transfer Learning 94.3% 17.1 MB
MobileNet 0.75 224+Transfer Learning 93.5% 10.5 MB
MobileNet 0.5 224+Transfer Learning 91.2% 5.5 MB
MobileNet 0.25 224+Transfer Learning 89.7% 2 MB
As shown in Table IX, we also evaluate the classification
accuracy for each type of private photo. It can be seen that our
deep learning model achieves higher classification accuracy for
each type of private photo than that of the baseline model. For
instance, the classification accuracy of ‘Photo ID’ and ‘Legal
Document’ is as high as 97.8%.
TABLE IX: Classification Accuracy for Each Type of Photo
Model Photo ID Legal Document Family Nude Public
SVM+BOVW 75.1% 71.5% 72.7% 63.8% 61.5%
MobileNet 1.0 224 97.8% 97.8% 95.6% 86.2% 94.3%
In Table X we further explore the misclassifications. Even
though there are a small number of misclassifications on
each type of private photo, none of these are mistakenly
classified as ‘Public’. That means although there exist such
misclassifications on some photos, this will not prevent the
PhotoSafer from prompting alerts to user.
TABLE X: Confusion Matrix of Private Photo Classification
Prediction
Photo ID Legal Document Family Nude Public
A
ct
u
a
l
Photo ID 265 4 2 0 0
Legal Document 2 92 0 0 0
Family 4 0 130 2 0
Nude 5 0 10 94 0
C. Photo Content Classification Time
As presented in Section III, in order to avoid affecting user
experience, we store the classification results of all stored
photos in a photo content database. We measure the time for
retrieving one record of a specific photo from the database,
compared with the time for making a classification of that
photo in real time. We run a total of 10 trials for each of
100 randomly selected photos, and the average time cost is
described in Table XI. It shows the time cost of the database-
based approach is 38 time less than that of running real-time
classifications.
TABLE XI: Time Cost for Obtaining Photo Content Classifi-
cation Result: From Database vs. Real-Time Classification
Method Time
From Database 5.2 ms
Real-Time Classification 190.7 ms
VI. DISCUSSIONS
Even though we implemented a prototype system, we did
not integrate it into the Android kernel due to time limitation.
In addition, although the proposed system is designed for
Android platform, it may also be applicable to other mobile
platforms. This section discusses the limitations of the current
design and implementation, and how it can be improved in the
next step of research.
Kernel Interposition. In our current prototype system,
we implemented a function to simulate apps that may access
photos under different system status and app-running status
in the real world. This is the only way the prototype can
(a) Driver’s License
(b) Photo ID
(c) Legal Document
(d) Family
(e) Nude
(f) Public
Fig. 3: Example photos in our dataset. Sensitive information
is removed from the photos.
being accessed. Otherwise, the prototype system requires the
root privilege in the Android system, which is not safe for user
to install such software. However, as described in Section III,
the best way is to implement photo access interposition in the
Android kernel. Since photos are accessed as regular files in
Android, all file access should be interposed. Additionally, the
kernel interposition needs to determine if the accessed file is
a photo through checking file extension (e.g., .jpg), so that
the system can decide in the kernel whether the accessed file
needs our proposed access control.
App Whitelist. In the current system design, we deter-
mine whether a photo access by a specific app is ‘unautho-
rized’ based the system status and app-running status, which
can cover most cases. However, in some cases, users are
satisfied with some apps that are running in the background
access photos. For instance, some users allow the Google
Photos app to backup the stored photos even if it is running
in the background. To consider such cases, the current system
design can be improved by adding an app whitelist. It allows
users to specify which apps can be granted access to all stored
photos without the proposed access control.
VII. RELATED WORK
Android Permissions The Android platform offers users
two approaches to controlling permissions. Before Android
6.0 (Marshmallow), apps are required to disclose the full
list of resources that they want to access at installation.
Users must grant all requested permissions; otherwise the
installation will be discontinued. Some work [2], [22] has
shown that few users pay attention to and really understand the
meaning of installation-time permissions. After Android 6.0,
users need to grant permissions only when an app requests
a sensitive resource for the first time. This scheme can offer
users contextual clues about why the requested resource is
necessary for an app. However, it does not account for the fact
that the user’s preference for subsequent permission requests
might be changed under different contextual circumstances.
Work has been done on permission models [2], [23], [24],
[25], [26], which found that users usually do not know
how apps access sensitive resources and how such access is
managed. Shih et al. [27] showed that private information is
more likely to be leaked when users are unaware of the purpose
for requesting a specific sensitive resource.
Almuhimedi et al. [28] analyzed AppOps, which is a
permission manager introduced in Android 4.3 but removed
in Android 4.4.2. AppOps allows users to review and modify
app permissions after apps are installed. They provided both
qualitative and quantitative evidence that the permission man-
ager can increase users’ awareness of privacy risks. A new
permission management system was introduced in Android
6.0 to replace AppOps, which allows users to review all
permissions that an app has been granted. However, since it is
hidden in the deep level of the Settings app, it is not easy
for average users to discover it. There exist several third-party
permission management apps, such as XPrivacy [29], Don-
keyGuard [30], Permission Manager [31] and Privacy Guard
[32]. However, these apps require additional privileges to
support their functionalities, since there is no official approach
offered to third-party apps to modify the permission system.
For example, XPrivacy requires an unlocked bootloader and
a custom recovery partition. Such restrictions are needed to
protect the permission system against interfering by malicious
apps.
Photo Privacy Ra et al. [33] designed a system P3 to
protect privacy of photos when they are shared on online
social networks. He et al. [34] proposed an approach to
protect users’ privacy for photo sharing. Jana et al. [35]
proposed a system Darkly based on the OpenCV library, which
protects users’ private information from continuous-sensing
applications. Templeman et al. [36] implemented a system
PlaceAvoider to protect visual privacy by identifying sensitive
places in video streams. Li et al. [37], [38] proposed two
systems for protecting bystanders’ privacy in photo taking. Tan
et al. [11] designed an access control scheme to protect private
photos on mobile phones, but it depends on pre-specified
target faces on mobile phones and can only provide limited
protection. Zerr et al. [19] collected a photo dataset from Flickr
with labels public, private or undecided. Then, they extracted
low-level features and trained a SVM model to identify private
photos. Squicciarini et al. [39] conducted an extensive study
based on the Flickr dataset collected by Zerr et al. and devel-
oped learning models to estimate adequate privacy settings for
shared photos in online social networks. Similar to the work by
Zerr et al. [19], Liu et al. [40] recruited workers to label photos
collected from Facebook as shared with “only me”, “some
friends”, “all friends”, “friends of friends”, and “everyone”.
They found that there is a big difference between the actual
labels on Facebook and labels obtained from workers. The
difference is due to the reason that Facebook users usually
share photos using the default privacy setting. Such difference
indicates that the default privacy setting on Facebook is much
lower than the privacy protection that users desire.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Motivated by a user survey and analysis of 200 apps’
permission requests, both of which showed the potential risk of
private photos being leaked without being known, we proposed
a system PhotoSafer to protect private photos that are stored on
mobile phones from being accessed without users’ awareness.
The access control on those private photos is enforced by
checking the system status and photo content. A mobile-
compatible private photo classifier was designed with transfer
learning. We implemented a prototype system, and evaluated
its performance and cost through experiments.
In future work, we plan to implement the app whitelist
module and integrate the system into the Android kernel. The
current design can protect several common types of private
photos. However, photo privacy is a very subjective problem.
Thus we will also consider designing personalized systems to
protect user-dependent private photos.
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